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I. Introduction
In this study we make use of high quality disaggregated data on
prices, income, consumer durable stocks, and other variables to
estimate residential demand for electricity in Massachusetts.'
In Part II below we discuss problems with the empirical speci-
fication of electricity'demand, both short run and long run. In
Part III we discuss the data in detail. In Part IV we present and
discuss the results of the estimation. Part V is a note on "lifeline"
electricity rates. Finally, we summarize the conclusions in Part VI.
An appendix lists the data sources.
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II. Problems in Estimating Electricity Demand
Declining Block Pricing: Infra-Marginal Price Changes
It has long been recognized that there are simultaneity problems
involved in estimating electricity demand. This is because electricity
is typically sold under a declining block schedule, so that marginal
and average prices are jointly dependent with quantity consumed. We
will take up this issue in the next section.
A second issue, and one which was unrecognized until (Taylor,
1975), is that declining block pricing also implies that both infra-
marginal and marginal prices should enter the demand equation; and
that changes in infra-marginal prices have income effects on demand.
To see this consider the consumer whose indifference curve between
electricity and other goods is shown in Figure 1. A two-part declin-
ing block schedule with a constant base fee is represented by the
price line abcd, Panel (a). The consumer is in equilibrium at point
e, facing a marginal price equal to the slope of segment ed. Now
the rate on the infra-marginal block only is increased. The new
price line is abc'd', Panel (b). The consumer will move to a new
equilibrium at e', consuming a smaller quantity of electricity at the
same marginal price. Segments cd and c'd' are parallel; the reduction
in quantity consumed is the result of an income effect and not of a
substitution effect.2 Thus, regression equations for the demand for
electricity should include both marginal and infra-marginal prices, for
different reasons. And, as Taylor points out, when the infra-marginal
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price is neglected the effect is to bias upward estimates of the
price elasticity of demand, because infra-marginal and marginal prices
are typically positively correlated.
The infra-marginal portion of a residential electric bill can be
thought of'as the lump-sum portion of a two-part tariff. If we know
the actual rate schedule under which electricity is purchased, as we
do here, we can calculate the'change for each customer and include it
in the demand equation. Since it represents an income effect, we
expect its coefficient to equal minus one times the coefficient of
income.
Declining Block Prices: Simultaneity
Contrary to (Taylor, p.79), our use of actual rate schedule data
does not eliminate the problem of simultaneity since, except in a
special case', marginal and infra-marginal prices still will be jointly
determined with quantity consumed. The supply schedule faced by each
purchaser is a declining block, so that price depends upon quantity
consumed. (Note that, given this kind of supply schedule, price is a
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single-valued function of quantity supplied, but not vice versa.)
Every consumer faces a different declining block; this identifies the
demand curve. From a formal point of view we may consider each particular
electric utility district's declining block supply schedule to be the
result of an industry supply schedule shifted by some unspecified
utility.district-specific variable. We shall not estimate this function,
but the reader should not think that this implies some "identification
problem ." We use non-stochastic supply schedules which show variation in
supply conditions, and it is this which identifies the demand function,
rather than the presence of exogenous variables in another regression
equation. The relevant issue is possible biases in different estimators;
to this issue we now turn.
Ordinary least squares estimates of the demand function will be
biased if price is not exogenous. There is a special case, however,
which may be practically important, where declining block prices cause
no estimation problems.
Suppose that changes in marginal or infra-marginal prices cause the
consumer to alter quantity purchased, but always by staying within a
given block (contrary to the situation described in footnote 1). In this
case both marginal and infra-marginal prices are exogenous to the con-
sumer, and so simultaneity problems disappear.
As a rough test for simultaneity we might comDare the residual at
each observation to that observation's rate blocks. If the residual is
smaller than the quantity change required to move into the next block,
in either direction, then we may be fairly certain that there is little
-5-
chance for potential switches.
Now, if price is endogenous then OLS estimates of the demand price
elasticity will be biased. We will estimate a logarithmic. demand
function. It can be hown3 that the estimated price elasticity is re-
lated to the true elas'icity as follows:
A
E(e) = C + (n-s) X
where E - estimated demand price elasticity,
E true demand price elasticity,
n R true supply price elasticity
AX a function of the errors in the supply and demand equations.
Normally n>O, c<O, Here <O because of declining block pricing, and
this tends to reduce the magnitude of the bias. Also, we know that the
curve we estimate is bounded by the supply and demand schedules. But
while typically we could say that this implied an upward bias in demand
price elasticity estimates, here we cannot know this since it is possible
that demand and supply have the configuration of Figure 2.
Price
)emand
zuppIy
Quantity
Figure 2 -
I
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In fact, however,.for reasons discussed in Section IV below, we are
inclined to expect some positive bias.
Stocks of Consumer Durables
While the importance of owned stocks of electricity using appliances
as a determinant of the demand foe electricity has long been recognized,
lack of adequate data on these stocks has usually precluded their use in
empirical work. Hence two sets of questions have gone largely unanswered.
First; to what extent do stocks explain short run variation in
demand? In particular, how does this variation depend on the composition
of the stocks? isher and Kaysen suggested that electricity demand would
become more income elastic over time for reasons having to do with the
distribution of stocks. Conservationists point to the high energy use
of appliances like color televisions and frost-free refrigerators,
supposedly "discretionary" appliances. Apart from increasing demand for
electricity, do these have systematic effects on the price elasticity of
demand?
The second unanswered set of questions concerns the effect of energy
prices on the demand for these consumer durables, since in the long run
the demand for electricity is essentially the demand for electricity-
using durable goods. Evidence on this point is mixed. 4
In the short run the demand for electricity by the household (qd)
depends upon its price (Pe), household income (Y), the stocks of various
electricity using appliances (S), and various other relevant variables
such as weather and housing characteristics (W):
qd. qd(PeY,S,W).
The prices of competing energy sources do not enter in the short run
since there is no scope for substitution out of electrically run appliances
into alternative gas and oil fueled appliances.
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Note that S is in fact a vector of, appliances. Different assets have
different characteristics which permit varying degrees of discretion in
the choice of utilization rates. And furthermore, we expect the distri-
bution of these assets to differ systematically among consumers, primarily
as a function of income. This is why we choose not to measure short-run
variation in electricity demand as variation in a stock utilization rate.
An implicit assumption of such a procedure would be that the long-run
utilization rate is a constant. We maintain, on the contrary, that the
long-run utilization rate is endogenous for two reasons: 1) For the same
reason that the short-run rate is endogenous;'namely, that it now pays to
set the thermostat back a few degrees etc.; and 2) Because increases in
real income will result in changes in the composition of owned assets
that systematically change the aggregate utilization rate. Thus if income
explains variation in the utilization rate, it is at least-partly because
Income explains the particular distribution of electricity using assets.
In the long run the demand for a stock of each type of electric
appliance CSi ) depends upon the expected relative prices of competing
fuels, the rental price of this (Pi) and competing assets (Pj), and
income (Y);
Si. = Si(Pelec. ,Pgas Pi PjY)
where i = refrigerators, heating systems, etc.
Costs of adjustment insure, however, that consumers will not
immediately bring their stocks in line with desired stock levels. Such
costs vary among assets. Costs of installation differ, and there are
better developed markets, say, in used televisions than for used home
heating systems. Consequently we should expect different adjustment speeds
for different asset types.
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For each asset type, then, one possible procedure would be to model
a distributed lag partial adjustment model. Together with the short run
information this would. permit estimation of short run and long elasticities,
as well as elasticity of demand for any intermediate length of time. This
requires a time series data set which displays variation in asset rental
prices as well as energy prices. As we shall see below, we do not have
sufficient data to follow this procedure.
As an alternative we estimate a logit model of residential
appliance choice. 5 The logit procedure recognizes that the choice of
appliance type (oil vs. electric water heat for example) is a discrete
choice of a particular durable goods for any given household. Observed
shares of each appliance type in the sample are assumed to correspond to
the subjective probabilities of these choices by a "typical. Consumer." The
regression equations generate "probability elasticities" with respect to
right-hand-side variables,
The form of the regression equations (in the case of three alternatives)
is
log (M1/M3) = a + aP 1 + a2P2 + ... + u1
log (M2/M3) = bo + blP1 + b2P2 + ... + u2
M1 + M2 + M3 = 1
where Mi is the share of the ith appliance type.
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III. Data
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is served by fifty electric utilities.
Some of these supply residential electricity under several rate schedules;
all-electric as well as standard, for example. The unit of observation
for this study is the average consumer on each residential rate schedule.
We discard eleven utilities at the outset. These discarded observations
correspond to geographical areas where there is no natural gas service.
All are rural and very small. The remaining sample still covers over 98%
of the population of the state.
For the remaining 39 electric utility districts we collect data for
purchase under a total of 57 residential rates. The rates are of three
types:
1) standard residential electric rates,
2) all-electric rates, typically available only if the household uses
electricity for both space and water heating, and
3) electric water heating rates. Sometimes water heaters are separately
metered and sometimes they are not. Even if they are not, however,
ownership of an electric water heater may permit the household to
purchase all electricity under a special rate' We have included
in our sample several observations where this was the case. We have
excluded, however, observations on consumption solely for the
purpose of water heating. If demand for electricity for this
purpose varies relatively less than does demand for all other
purposes then our dependent variable will overstate slightly the
variation in consumption.
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Our sample contains 39 standard, 16 all-electric, and two water-rate
observations. The variables are constructed as follows: (A complete list
of the final data sources is given in the appendix.)
Prices and Quantity
For each rate schedule we calculate average monthly consumption in
kilowatt hours (KWh) for 1975. We can then 'use the rate schedule to
determine the marginal price and value of all infra-marginal charges,
which we call the "demand fee." The demand fee is equal to the total
electric bill less less the quantity (marginal price times KWh). In
cases where rates were changed sometime during 1975, we use weighted averages
of the old and new rates, where the weights are the number of weeks each
was in force.
Fuel Adjustment Charges
Utilities can vary the retail price of electricity to their residential
customers without going through any formal rate change proceedings by means
of "fuel adjustment charges." Such charges are intended to permit utilities
to "pass on to the consumer" changes in the cost of fuel to the utilities
without constantly adjusting rates. Especially in recent years, a sub-
stantial portion of retail price variation is due to variation in the
fuel adjustment charges, rather than in the rates themselves. The fuel
adjustment is, in every case, a fee in cents per KWh applied to every KWh
consumed. Hence it enters both the marginal price and the demand fee.
We use, for each utility, the' fuel adjustment charge in force on January 1,
1975.
The means and standard deviations of the-quantity, marginal price,
and demand fee observations are as follows:
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Mean Standard Deviation
KWh (Kilowatt hours/ 900.04 714.39
month/household)
PM (¢/KWh) 3.90 .64
FEE ( $ ) 4.74 2,36
One is struck by how low the implicit demand fee is. Even when
looking only at the subset corresponding to all-electric homes, the
average monthly figure is only $6.22. It is not surprising when we find
that this variable appears to have little effect on consumption. The
mean marginal price for standard rates is 4.014 /KWh; on all-electric
rates it is only 3.586 /KWh.
Income
The Internal Revenue Service has published the 1969 adjusted gross
income for each 5-digit zip code service area in the United States. It
is easy to establish the zip code makeup of each electric utility dis-
trict, and so arrive at a per household average monthly income for each
district. It would be better to have more recent data, but Congress
ordered the IRS to cease publishing such data in the early 1970's, on
privacy grounds. As a suggestion to its accuracy, the simple correlation
between median family income in 23 Massachusetts counties and SMSA's in
1969 and 1975 is just over .88. While not perfect, this is perhaps as
good an income cross-section as one is likely to get. The mean and
standard deviation (1975 dollars) are $1167.37 and $319.96 respectively.
Appliance Stocks
A mail survey tak6n by the Federal government (Project Conserve) in
Massachusetts in Spring, 1976, provides data on appliance ownership,
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housing characteristics, etc., for single family dwellings. There were
136,000 responses received, though for purposes of this study we use a
random sub-sample of 29,445. We assign each response to an electric
utility district and calculate for each district per single family dwelling
ownership of the five electric appliances listed below.
per SFD ownership of: Mean Standard Deviation
electric space heat .05 .03
electric water heat .23 .09
electric stove .63 .17
color TV .80 .08
frost-free refrigerator .74 .06
Per single family dwelling is not the same as per household, but
there is no obvious way to do better. In any case, we also include
the percentage of customers living in single family dwellings as an
explanatory variable in regression equations.
One peculiarity worth noting here is that per SFD ownership of
four of the above five electric appliances have negative simple cor-
relation coefficients with income, electric stoves being the exception.
The simple r associated with color TV sets, -.40, is the largest and
most surprising.
Gas Price
The final variable is the average residential price of natural gas.
This was constructed for each electric utility district from data reported
by each of the nineteen gas utilities which serve the Commonwealth. Its
mean is $3.15/MCF with a standard deviation of $.29.
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IV. Empirical Results
Short Run
Various forms for the demand equation were tried. We settled on
a simple logarithmic form, using single-equation ordinary least squares.
The estimated demand equation is (t-statistics in parentheses):
KWh = 3.95 - .08 PM + .32 Y + .13 PSFD + 1.37 HEAT
(.40) (2.28) (1.44) (19.33)
+ .60 WATER + .19 STOVE + .09 COLOR TV - .66 FROST
(3.73) (1.70) (.22) (1.39)
R2 = .9132
SER = .2153
where all variables are in logs and
KWh = kilowatt hours consumed per month per household
PM = marginal price of electricity
Y = income
PSFD = percentage of customers living in single family dwellings
HEAT = a dummy variable, equal to one if consumption is on an all-
electric rate and zero otherwise
WATER = a dummy variable, equal to one if consumption is on a rate dis-
counted for owners of electric water heaters and zero otherwise
STOVE = per single family dwelling ownership of electric stoves
COLOR TV = per single family dwelling ownership of color televisions
FROST = per singlefamily dwelling ownership of frost-free refrigerators.
In various regressions the demand fee was never a significant
explainer of consumption. Nor was its coefficient usually different
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from minus one times that of income, though this was a result more of
a large standard error than of anything else. So we simply subtract the
fee from gross income; the resulting net income is the explanatory
varable we use in all subsequent regressions.
The short run price elasticity is very-small - less than .1 - and
not significantly different from zero. This is not surprising given
that we are holding household electric appliance stocks constant. The
income elasticity - .32 - is also reasonable in this equation. As
expected, electricity consumption by households. in single family
dwellings is, ceberis peribus, higher than for households in multiple
family dwellings.
The HEAT and WATER variables turn out to be critical. If they are
deleted the explanatory power of the regression falls dramatically.
More importantly, they strongly affect the coefficients of other
variables. If they are deleted the coefficients of PM and of Y reverse
sign, implying positive price elasticity and negative income elasticity.
If we then enter per household ownership of electric heat and electric
water heat as alternative explanatory variables, they do not do nearly
so good a job as the original variables. Most of the variation remains
unaccounted for, and an unbelievably large price elasticity of -1.33 is
implied. It is not surprising that these latter alternatives do not per-
form nearly so well since it is much more difficult to match up variation
in these with the proper rate schedule. Indeed, we find a negative
partial correlation between per household electric heat and our HEAT
dummy.
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Other household appliance stocks are less important. Deleting various
2
of them only marginally reduces R , and does not alter other regression
coefficients, Furthermore, the negative coefficient of FROST was an
anomaly which showed up in almost all of the regressions. We have no
explanation for this.
Note that we exclude the price of oil and natural gas from these
regression equations. In the short run there is little or no scope for
substitution into alternative fuels. We also exclude temperature since
variation in this variable would mean little with our sample. We also
exclude other characteristics of the housing stock. Project Conserve
does offer some data in this area; but the analysis of this data is a
topic in its own right. Given our high R2 there is little to be gained
by forcing long variable lists into this equation.
Examination of the residuals indicated no patterns. Fr 52 or the 57
observations "predicted" consumption falls in the same rate block as
Actual consumption, Under the hypothesis of no simultaneity bias, the,
residuals are BLUE estimators for the errors. The fact that most residuals
are small enough not to push consumption into another rate block is a
hopeful indicator that actual simultaneity bias is slight.
.ong' Run
Our long run results are generally weaker than the short run results
just discussed. With a few exceptions, we are.not able convincingly to
explain variation in appliance-type shares with prices and incomes alone.
There are, we believe, two reasons for this.
First, several variables which we would expect to have an effect on
appliance choice are essentially invariant within Massachusetts. There is
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no believable reason to think that there are systematic differences in
asset rental prices across the Commonwealth. Similarly, the retail price
of oil shows little cross-sectional variation, as. one expects in a
highly competetive market. Consequently, whatever variation one does
observe in appliance shares is largely due to "other factors" which
this model is poorly equipped to explain.
Secondly, the calculation of appliance shares from data on the
outstanding stock obscures the fact that these shares have changed
dramatically in recent years. For example, after 1973 shortages of
natural gas developed in Massachusetts. New gas hook-ups were
severely curtailed - eliminated in many areas. This followed a period
during which gas utilities had encouraged gas appliance use.
Similarly, the history of construction of all-electric homes shows
wide and rapid swings. After the oil price increases of 1973, con-
struction of all-electric homes virtually ceased. The following
table illustrates the difference in fuel shares between the 1974
stock of homes and the 1970-1974 flow of new housing. (This data is
for the Boston SMSA only.)
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Table 1
Home Heating Fuel
Fuel Oil
Utility Gas
1974 Stock
66.8%
27.8%
1970-1974 New Construction
24.9%
34.7%
Electricity
Al 1 other
Cooking Fuel Shares
1974 Stock 1970-1974 New Construction
Utility Gas
Electricity
Bottle Gas
All other
Source: See appendix.
Shares
5.0%
.4%
40.1%
.3%
57.8%
40.6%
1.3%
25.4%
73.5%
1.1%
.3%
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To be sure, there is substantial variation in
variables.
Mean
each of the dependent
Standard Deviation
space
heat og
log
water
heat log
(og
cooking og
(ME/):MO
(ME/MO'.
ME/MG) (E O
(M MG) :
:.:More interesting is the
R1 R2
R1 .12
R2
pattern
R3
-. 09
.24
R3
R4
of simple correlations:
R4 R5
.21 -.25
.90 -.73
.37 .27
-.90
The high positive correlation between R4 and R2 and negative
correlation between R4 and R5 tell us that whenever natural gas is used for
any major appliance it will probably be used for all. In contrast, note the
negative correlation between R1 and R3, and between R1 and R5. No such
presumption exists for electricity.
The individual regressions are as follows:
(t-statistics in parentheses)
R1
R2
-2.44
- .83
R3
R4
- .45
- .09
.87
.85
.56
.98
.99R5 ..68
___ _ _
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Space Heating
1) log (elec./oil) = 1.94 - .83 PM - .08 FEE - .001 Y + .115 PG
(4.90) (1.71) (3.25) (.34)
R2 = .3758
SER = .7200
2) log (gas/oil) = -2.10 - .07 PM + .07 FEE - .0001 Y + .42 PG
(.33) (1.35) (.35) (1.03)
R2 = .0728
SER = .8606
PG is the price of natural gas; all other variables are as previously
defined.
Equation 1) indicates a price elasticity of the probability of
electricity's being chosen of -.83, a reasonable number. The other
coefficients are also reasonable though the small, significant negative
income effect is odd. It could be explained if all electric homes were
built in lower rather than higher income areas after 1969.
Other Appliances
Regression results for water heating and cooking fuel were not very
successful, For the convenience of the reader they are reproduced here.
Water Heating:
(elec.'
log oil = -2.33 +,03 PM +.007 FEE -.0002 Y +.62 PG
(.23) (.21) (.81) (2.37)
R2 = .1226r-
SER ,5467
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log (gas/oil) = -1.12 - .20 PM +
(:87)
R2 = 0606
SER = .9916
Cooking Fuel:
log (elec./gas) = .53 + .26 PM
(1.14)
- .01 FEE +
(.23)
.0008 Y - .56 PG
(1.96) (1.19)
R = .1001
SER = .9842
.03 FEE
(.51)
.002 Y
(.45)
+ .66 PG
(1 .39)
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V. Note on "Lifeline" Rates
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in re-structuring
electricity rates for social purposes. A frequent proposal is the so-
called "lifeline" electricity rate schedule. Such a schedule would
lower the cost to the consumer of using relatively small amounts of
energy by reducing the price charged for some monthly base quantity.
One way of accomplishing this would be by inverting rate schedules, so
that the marginal price rose rather than fell with increased consumption.
Indeed, inverting electric rate schedules has often been proposed on
efficiency grounds as well. But it is equity considerations, rather
than efficiency, which motivate the "lifeline" proposals.
Two justifications have typically been advanced for "lifeline"
pricing; we shall look at each. The first is that a moderate amount of
electric energy is necessary to a decent standard of living, and that
society should be willing to provide this minimum amount of energy at
very low cost to all of its members. This is a logical justification
for "lifeline" rates. But it should be pointed out that it makes no
mention of redistributing income from upper to lower income consumers.
The second justification is that it would be desirable to reduce
the burden of electric bills to the poor. Since it is recognized that
utilities cannot identify and/or adopt preferential pricing toward the
poor per se, it is proposed that all customers be guaranteed a moderate
amount of electricity at very low cost. Unlike the first justification,
which is always valid, this argument is Valid only under certain empirical
conditions, which may or may not be met in any given electric utility
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district. Only if consumption and income are positively correlated
within the utility district will the desired transfer take place;
6
otherwise the burden will be shifted toward the poor. A positive
income elasticity of demand does not guarantee this, since this
partial effect may easily be offset by the other factors which
determine electricity consumption.
Ideally we would wish to know the correlation between KWh and Y
within every electric utility district. The tables we reproduce
below, however, are calculated across utility districts. For interest,
we include the simple correlation of income with the marginal price
and demand fee.
Table 2
Simple Correlation Coefficients: Standard Rates
Income Marginal Price Demand Fee
Marginal Price -.20
Demand Fee .14 -.32
KWh consumed .51 -.07 .13
Simple Correlation Coefficients: All-Electric Rates
Income Marginal Price Demand Fee
Marginal Price -.19
Demand Fee -.05 -.38
KWh consumed .37 -.18 .57
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Income and consumption are,. in fact; positively correlated, so at
least the net direction of the income re-distribution is progressive.
With these relatively low correlations, however, the efficiency of such
a scheme is questionable.
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VI. Conclusions
We use ordinary least square estimates of a simple logarithmic short
run demand function and of a logit model for long run appliance choice.
We believe that the data used is superior in both accuracy and variation
to that employed in most dis-aggregated studies of electricity demand.
We recognize the problem of simultaneity bias, but argue that it is
minor in our sample.
We conclude that in the short run the own price elasticity of demand
for electricity is very small - only about -.08. The income elasticity
of demand is about .32. Both of these estimates are reasonable when
one holds appliance stocks constant.
The demand fee associated with declining block rates is a much
smaller part of the total electricity bill than was perhaps thought.
It does not appear to influence electricity consumption' significantly
in the short run, though it does have some effect on long run choice.
The most important consumer durable influencing electricity con-
sumption is, as might be expected, electric space heating. Long run
demand for this durable good is significantly responsive to changes in
the retail price of electricity, both in the marginal price and in the
demand fee. The elasticity with respect to marginal price is about -.83.
( It should be pointed out again that Massachusetts owners of all-electric
homes pay, on average, a lower marginal price than do consumers on
standard rates; and only a slightly larger demand fee.) The cross
elasticity of demand for electric space heat with respect to the
price of natural gas is .12.
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The logit results are weakened since we are unable to capture
variation in the price of fuel oil, which is New England's most im-
portant heating fuel. Also, regression analysis does not reveal the
importance of natural gas shortages in recent years.
Finally, appliances such as color televisions and frost free re-
frigerators seem neither to be major explainers of residential con-
sumption, nor particularly responsive to electricity price changes.
With' respect to "lifeline" electric pricing, it appears that the
net effect of such rates would be a slight reduction in the share of
the burden borne by lower income groups. The correlation is far from.
perfect, however, and there may exist many low income sub-groups which
would end up with larger shares of the burden.
·-*-!
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Footnotes
1. Related studies which may be of interest to the reader include (Acton,
Mitchell, and Mowill, 1976) and (Levy, 1973).
2. It is possible that the consumer will move to a point like f below, on
a different portion of the rate schedule. For the moment we assume that
this "switching" does not occur.
other
goods
electrici ty
3. See, for example, (Rao and Miller, 1971, pp. 195-197). The derivation of
this expression actually depends on expressing quantity supplied as a
single-valued function of price and other variables. We noted above this
is not the case with declining block supply schedules. The critical
feature of negative correlation between errors in the demand equation
and marginal price remains, however.. For these purposes no violence is
done to the argument by "pretending" that the supply schedule is smooth.
4. Fisher and Kaysen conclude that the effects of energy prices are negli-
gible (except for water heaters and ranges). Chapman et. al. find a
significant effect using an aggretate appliance price index as an
explanatory variable, but it is unclear why such an index should show
cross-section variation; or if it is even appropriate in a regression
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where the dependent variable is electricity consumption. Wilson finds
that the price of electricity is generally a significant factor ex-
plaining appliance ownership.
5. This approach is discussed in (Hartman and Hollyer). In particular,
see their discussion of the issue of equality of corss elasticity con-
straints in the Appendix.
6. Of course, even if the correlation is of the correct sign, still
this may be an inefficient mechanism for redistributing income.
See (Berg and Roth, 1976)
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Appendix: Data Sources
Income: Internal Revenue Service adjusted gross income by 5-digit zip
code, aggregated to the appropriate electric utility district. See U.S.
I.R.S., "Federal Individual Income Tax Return Data for Each 5-Digit Zip
Code Area in Massachusetts: 1969" N.T.I.S. Report # PB 209 321 (May, 1972).
Price of electricity, expenditure on electricity, consumption of elec-
tricity, fuel adjustment charges: Electric utility annual reports on
-file with the office of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities,
and the U.S. Federal Power Commission, National Electric Rate Book,
Massachusetts issues for August 1976 and January 1975.
Appliance Stocks: Project Conserve details ownership of the various
assets for single family dwellings by 5-digit zip code area. These are
aggregated to the appropriate electric utility district.- Project Conserve
data was supplied by the New England Energy Management Information System
at the M.I.T. Energy Lab.
Price of Gas: Average price for each of the neneteen gas supplying
utilities in Massachusetts, from data on file with the state Department
of Public Utilities. The geographic composition of each gas utility is
taken from the New England Gas Association, Membership and Statistical
Directory: 1975, Boston (December 1975). Note that there is a single,
small supplier of gas, the Athol Gas Co., which does not belong to the
New England Gas Association.
Percentage of households which are single family dwellings, number of
households (for weighting purposes): "Detailed Housing Characteristics"
of the 1970 Census of Housing, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Data on fuel shares for the Boston SMSA (Table l)-is from the U.S.
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Bureau of the Census, Annual Housing Survey: 1974, "Housing Characteris-
tics for the Boston SMSA," H-170-74-3 (September 1976).
All data is for 1975 except for the Appliance Stocks, which come from
a survey taken in April-June 1976; income, which is for 1969; and the
demographic variables, which are from the 1970 Census. Given the
unusual detail with which we observe these variables, (aggregating from
zip code areas and towns to electric utility districts) it is unlikely
that this introduces any significant bias.
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